Logical Realism and Ezumezu Logic

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Abstract
This paper examines the metaphysical status of Ezumezu logic in the direction of logical realism. While presenting Ezumezu logic as a prototype of African logic, Chimakonam makes statements that somewhat entail logical monism. Using the method of critical analysis of related literature, the paper argues that presenting Ezumezu logic as one of the prototypes of African logic while at the same time making claims that elevate it to a hegemonic status, gives rise to what is regarded in the paper as the monist-pluralist paradox. Drawing lessons from Abakedi's ID paradox, the paper argues that a monist logical foundation for African logic cannot be consistently defended without paradoxes. The paper proposes that different African philosophies should be grounded by different African logics such that one need not be trained in one particular prototype such as Ezumezu logic or argue in conformity to it to qualify as an African professional or scholar.
Keywords: Independent-Dependent Paradox. African Logic, Logical realism, Ezumezu logic. Monist-Pluralist Paradox.

Introduction

Logical realism has been extensively discussed (cf. SHER 2011; LAPOINTE 2014; SHAPIRO 2014; RUSH 2014; MCSWEENEY 2018, 2019; ABAKEDI 2020; and TAHKO 2021, to mention but a few). Logical realism has been defined in different ways by different authors, but in this paper, it will be regarded as "the view about the metaphysical status of logic" (TAHKO 2021). Logical monism and logical pluralism are the two common schools of thought in logical realism. Members of both schools have remained divided over whether logic is one or many (ABAKEDI 2020, 1). Whereas the logical monists argue that there is a single logic, or one-true-logic that correctly describes the world (MCSWEENEY 2018, 2019); the logical pluralists argue that there are many logics that serve as human tools of description and explanation (cf. CARNAP 2001, 52; NEALL & RESTALL 2001, 29; BACCIAGALUPPI 2009). So, the question of whether logic is one or many is unavoidable when talking about the grounding, foundation or metaphysical status of any logic.

The debate between the logical monists and pluralists is one direction in which Western scholars have discussed the metaphysical status of logic. Among African philosophers, the direction of discourse on the metaphysical status of logic is explicated by the debate between the Universalists and the Afrocentrists. It could be said, and rightly so, that the debate between the Universalists and the Afrocentrists is indirectly about logical monism and logical pluralism. This is because both Universalism, which is the view that logic is universal (cf. UDUMA 2015; CHIMAKONAM 2015b, 2019, 2018) and Afrocentricism−the view that logic is culture-bound or culturally relative (IJIOMAH 1995; CHIMAKONAM 2015b), explicate the thesis of a one-true-logic (OTL hereafter) in different ways[1]. The former proposes a OTL that is universal, the latter proposes a OTL that is universal only within a given cultural context. The universality of logic and the contextuality of logic has been discussed by some authors (PUTNAM 1979, BACCIAGALUPPI 2009).

Chimakonam supposes that there is a ground logic for every discipline (2019, xxii). In searching for the ground logic of the discipline of African philosophy he presented Ezumezu logic as the foundation of the discipline of African philosophy. However, this entails making it the OTL for African philosophy. But African philosophy is a broad concept for many philosophies, so making Ezumezu logic the logic-based criterion of African philosophy entails proposing one logical foundation for all possible African philosophies. But can the thesis of one logical foundation for all possible African philosophies be consistently defended without falling into a paradoxical situation involving monism and pluralism? This is where a critique of Ezumezu logic from the perspective of logical realism becomes significant.

The paper has five sections. The first section introduces the problem and significance of the paper. The second section attempts to show that Chimakonam's proposal of a single logical foundation for all possible African philosophies stands paradoxical with his description of Ezumezu logic as a single prototype of African logic. The third section discusses how Chimakonam's Ezumezu logic stands in relation to Abakedi's ID paradox. The fourth section discusses the paradox of inconsistent metaphysical categorization observed in Chimakonam's version of realism about (Ezumezu) logic. The fifth section concludes the paper.

Ezumezu Logic and the Monist-Pluralist Paradox
Revisiting the question of African logic in relation to logical realism, one may ask: is Chimakonam a logical monist or a logical pluralist? To determine how Chimakonam responds to this question, some of his comments are highlighted here in the paper. In the preface to his *Ezumezu Logic,* He observes:

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[1] One-true-logic (OTL) is a concept often used to describe the best logic among others that correctly describes the world or some real state of affairs. This concept is further explained in section 3.

I here offer a system of logic for African philosophy and sundry disciplines in African studies, Christened Ezumezu logic, it is only a prototype of African logic…another similar system that can axiomatize the conception of reality in Africa is possible. Logic is not a property of one race; we must wake up from this false impression. It is a tool many people can fashion and use in ways that aid them better in the advancement of knowledge. (2019, xii-xiii)

The expression that Ezumezu logic is only a prototype of African logic, and the statement about the possibility for the existence of other systems of logic that can axiomatize the conception of reality in Africa, simply betray Chimakonam's support for logical pluralism rather than logical monism. What this means is that there can be more than one African logic that can axiomatize the concept of reality in Africa. One would have expected that this view be consistently defended, but it turns out that it is not, as there are some remarks within the ground-breaking book on Ezumezu logic that betrays the author's tilt towards logical monism, which conflicts with his initial support for logical pluralism. This is evident as follows:

…I conceive this book as the "game changer" for two main reasons. First, the nagging issue about the methodology of African philosophy has led to different people proposing all kinds of theories most of which, by their structure, should properly belong to Western philosophy…Thus, suffice it to say that with the formulation of Ezumezu, it would now be easy to separate discourses that qualify as African philosophy and those that do not. In other words, if a discourse cannot be grounded in Ezumezu logic, it is probably a discourse in Western philosophy and it would not matter who authored it, where it is authored or what title it is given. …Ultimately, we must be courageous to ask, what makes a discourse African philosophy? And, what makes an individual an African philosopher? In the first case, we have to look out for the background logic from which the critical questions are generated and ask ourselves whether it has been properly formulated to map the ontological orientation in African worldview? If this has been done, then we have to check to see if the methods of the discipline have been grounded in the logic. Once the report is affirmative, then such a discourse is an exercise in African philosophy…any philosopher that does not understand the logic that undergirds his field is no philosopher to begin with. On the strength of the preceding therefore, it may now be said with authority that no student of African philosophy can be considered as properly trained if he has no firm grasp of the logic of the discipline. In formulating Ezumezu logic, I have not simulated any form of genius; I have merely done what Aristotle did some three centuries B.C. for the world intellectual history, only that in this case, I completed the project he began by formulating a logical model covering the remaining sphere of human thinking (the complementary inferential mode, future contingents and issues arising in the structure of modern physics) which Aristotle did not cover in his programme, logic being a field of ideas rather than a rising structure. (2019, xxii)

The first idea we get from the above quotation is that (a) Ezumezu logic is presented as the sole criterion for what counts as African philosophy because it is the ground-logic or foundational logic. The second idea is that (b) any philosophy that is not grounded on Ezumezu logic is not African, irrespective of who the author is, where the author resides, or what caption is given to it. The third idea is that (c) since the logical foundation of African philosophy is Ezumezu, any student of African philosophy that does not have a firm grasp of this logic cannot be considered as having been properly trained in African philosophy. The fourth idea is that (d) Ezumezu logic is a completion of an uncompleted project that Aristotle started three centuries ago, and specifically, this completion is the formulation of a logical model that covers the remaining sphere of human thinking such as complementary inferential mode, future contingents and issues arising from the structure of modern physics. About these four ideas, there are many reservations, some of which are discussed in the following paragraphs.

As earlier mentioned, Chimakonam (2019, xii) clearly admits that Ezumezu logic "is only a prototype of African logic, meaning that other prototypes of African logic that axiomatize the conception of reality in Africa are possible (this is logical pluralism). However, the views in (a) and (b) rule out the possibility of more than one prototype for grounding of African philosophies. The view in (a) makes Ezumezu logic the sole criterion for determining any theoretical or speculative inquiry that can be called 'African'. The view in (b) specifically presents Ezumezu logic as the supposed OTL that grounds African philosophy. In other words, Ezumezu logic is presented as the one true logical foundation for African philosophy vis-à-vis African philosophies.

Making a radically constructed logic-prototype the sole logical foundation of a broad discipline involving critical human reflections, such as African philosophy, is worrisome. This is because rather than eliminate the old problem of the subservience of theoretical inquiries to a hegemonic classical logic that Chimakonam has extensively discussed, making Ezumezu logic the logical grounding of what can be described as African Philosophy is like re-introducing the same problem of hegemonic subservience through the back-door, but in this context, for a large geographical group. This view is unavoidable because whereas he describes the Aristotelian prototype-logic as alien, he ends up presenting Ezumezu logic, the radically constructed African prototype, as an improvement of this supposed alien logic. The result is a revised or refurbished supposedly alien logic, cloaked with a new identity and given a new encrypted name *Ezumezu.* Nevertheless, fluctuating between the possibilities for logical pluralism about an axiomatisable African logic on the one hand, and eliminating this possibility by proposing a supposedly one-true-logical foundation for African philosophy on the other hand, is an inconsistency that is here regarded as the *monist-pluralist* (MP) paradox.

It can be argued that if it is possible that other systems of logic, other than Ezumezu, indicating how some Africans conceive reality can be axiomatized; then Ezumezu being a single prototype of such possibility, cannot enjoy the metaphysical

status of a single logical ground for African philosophy. This is because the possibility of logical pluralism about *axiomatisable* systems of African logic, yields the possibility for different philosophies that can be described as African with different logical foundations. This leads to the question whether Chimakonam (2019, xii) is right to say that one who does not have a grasp of Ezumezu logic is not properly trained in African philosophy. Accepting such a view will translate to accepting that to be trained in African philosophy is to be trained, firstly, in a constructed or invented monistic logical prototype that has been elevated to an absolute instance in exactly the same way in which logical monists speculate about a OTL. How can such a view be defended, especially where the supposed Ezumezu logic is a logical prototype derived by the radical reconstruction of the Aristotelian prototype (which he describes as alien) merely by the introduction of a supposedly mathematized version of some logical notions not accounted for by the Aristotelian formulation?

It will be very difficult for one to agree with Chimakonam that the project of the formulation of all possible logical notions arising from the way human beings conceive the world has been completed in his Ezumezu logic, because as he claims, he has covered the remaining sphere of human thinking−the complementary inferential mode, future contingents and issues arising in the structure of modern physics that Aristotle did not cover in his formulation. This view can be strongly contested because reality is dynamic, and human conceptions of reality are dynamic. Reality continues to unfold, and new methods and approaches continue to spring up. Therefore, many other logical notions will continue to come up. Besides there could be many other logical notions that the formulation of Ezumezu logic does not account for. For instance, Chimakonam's formulation does not account for Asouzu's notion of future referentiality (ASOUZU 2009) as distinct from Lukasiewicz's notion of future contingency. This is a crucial idea for further reflections. More so, Chimakonam's formulation does not account for the logical notion of 'non-simultaneous measurability' or 'incompatibility of measurement', which is the ontological focus of mathematization and axiomatization in Orthomodular lattice-models of quantum logic that arise from the experimental propositions about the observation or measurement of quantum mechanical systems.

So, Chimakonam is in error to suppose that a single logic-prototype can cover the "sphere of human thinking" as if "the sphere of human thought" is a determinable set with finite elements. Even if it were, the human subject would have to be immortal to exist in every possible generation of human beings to familiarize with all possible logical notions that may arise in the future. If Aristotle's project was about formulating a logical model that accounts for different logical notions arising from the conception of realities that continue to unfold in multifaceted ways, then such a project cannot be completed by any single person or any single generation because reality is multifaceted, dynamic and evolutionary. Moreover, the debate between the logical monists and the logical pluralists is simply about whether one logic-prototype-model can possibly account for the formulation of all possible logical notions that can arise from all possible worlds; or whether the formulation of all possible logical notions that can arise from all possible worlds requires multiple prototype-logics.

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To avoid what is regarded in the paper as the Monist-Pluralist paradox, Chimakonam can either consistently defend the possibility of more than one axiomatisable model of African logic by admitting that there can be different ground-logics for different African philosophies, or he could just discard this dimension of logical pluralism and defend the view that there is just one true logical foundation of all African philosophies and theoretical inquiries. But to do this, he will still need the classical bivalent (two-valued) logic that he describes as an alien logic; otherwise, he may have to argue that one can simultaneously hold unto both logical monism and logical pluralism by appealing to some form of paraconsistent logic or complementary logic. But the view that there is a OTL called Ezumezu logic that grounds African philosophy and by logical extension, African philosophies; and the view that there are different true logics that constitute the foundations of different African philosophies, cannot both be consistently defended simultaneously.

Lessons from the Independent-Dependent Paradox
Abakedi identified the Independent-dependent (ID) paradox in his critique of McSweeney's paper on *Metaphysical Logical Realism* where she defended the existence of a OTL (i) that correctly describes the world, (ii) that is true on account of a mind-and-language-independent world, (iii) and that is metaphysically privileged because it is better than any other logic at capturing the true nature of reality (MCSWEEEY 2018, 1; ABAKEDI 2020, 128). The ID paradox is significant to this paper because the critical philosophical problem it brings to the table is also relevant to any appraisal or critique of Ezumezu logic.

One common argument often raised in favour of logical monism is that it has a truth-maker. For instance, McSweeney argued that the OTL is true on account of a mind-and-language-independent world (MCSWEENEY 2017, 2018). And according to Sider, logical notions are the most fundamental language that perfectly captures reality's structure (SIDER 2011). Since Chimakonam claims his constructed universalizable African prototype covers logical notions such as complementary inferential mode, future contingence and issues in quantum physics, which he thinks are the remaining spheres of "human thinking"; then he directly or indirectly presupposes that these logical notions are the most fundamental language that perfectly captures the structure of reality. This view is unavoidable, especially where Ezumezu logic is being presented as an axiomatized system that preserves these logical notions within mathematization.

In this way, Chimakonam presents his Ezumezu logic as a OTL for indigenous African theoretical inquiries because by describing it as the foundation of African philosophy, he assigns to it a metaphysical status as well as a function that no other African logic should supposedly enjoy, in much the same way in which McSweeney describes her supposed OTL as metaphysically privileged. Since Chimakonam has clearly stated in different places in his work that Ezumezu logic axiomatizes the African's conception of reality; therefore, he makes 'reality' the truth-maker of Ezumezu logic. In other words, Ezumezu is true on account of reality. In other words, the logical notions preserved within the axiomatization of Ezumezu logic should capture the structure of reality, at least within the African context of cognition, conception and valuation.

For many logical monists, a logic is true because it has a truth-maker that is independent of the human mind and language. For instance, many logical monists regard the mind-and-language-independent world as the truth-maker of the OTL. Some argue that the mind-and-language-independent world has just a single structure, such that any logic that correctly describes this structure, is the supposed OTL (MADDY 2002; SIDER 2011). For instance, Putnam once reasoned that since the logical notions preserved within axiomatization in classical logic failed to explain the observable/measurable behaviour of quantum entities; then classical logic is not the OTL, rather quantum logic is (PUTNAM 1968, 1979, 2005; ABAKEDI, 2018, 2019). Putnam's attempt to replace a supposed OTL, classical logic with another is typical of the logical monist camp that supposes that the structure of reality is single and only a single logic, the OTL correctly describes it. But as to what this logic is, there is no consensus.

That the supposed single structure of the world is mind-and-language-independent has been consistently defended because as Rush argues, it will still exist even in the absence of human minds being cognitive of it or human language to describe it (RUSH 2014, 15). Even if one were to accept Ezumezu as the OTL of African philosophy and African theoretical inquiries, one may not deny that Ezumezu should be true on account of conceivable realities. So, one could ask whether the realities that Africans conceive are mind-and-language-independent (MLID from now onwards) or mind-and-language-dependent (MLD from now onwards); because for scholars like McSweeney (2018), the world that the supposed OTL correctly describes and which is at the same time its truth-maker is MLID. However, there is a problem here, which Abakedi points out thus:

> To say that it is the mind-and-language-independent world that makes the OTL true is to propose some form of dependence of the OTL on the mind-and-language-independent world. This looks like Platonism. One of the thesis of logical realism is that 'logical facts' are-mind-and-language-independent…Describing 'logical facts' in this manner implies that it

> belongs to the metaphysical category of mind-and-language-independence. If the mind-and-language-independent world is what makes the OTL true, then whatever is regarded as 'logical facts' should be facts of the OTL. In other words, if the OTL is true on account of a mind-and-language-independent world and the OTL is at the same time the real logical structure, which is mind-and-language-independent; then the OTL is itself mind-and-language-independent or it is in the mind-and-language-independent world. This sounds paradoxical… (ABAKEDI 2020, 130)

Worldly entities are commonly regarded as 'logical facts' because they are taken for granted to be supposedly MLID (LAPOINTE 2014). And if the MLID world, which is composed of worldly entities (also regarded as logical facts) is what makes the supposed OTL that correctly describes these logical facts true; then for this OTL to be true, it should also be MLID. Put simply, a OTL that is true on account of a MLID world, which it supposedly correctly describes, should itself be MLID in order to be true. But how can a supposedly OTL that is independent of the human mind and language correctly describe a world that is independent of the human mind and language, when a description is itself a mind-and-language-dependent activity? This is one aspect of the ID paradox. The other aspect is that a supposedly MLID OTL that supposedly describes correctly, the true logical structure of the world, is also something that has to be correctly described. But the supposed OTL cannot describe the true logical structure of the world as well its own structure at the same time. The supposed OTL will definitely require another true logic to correctly describe it since it cannot describe itself. But admitting another true logic that is not the OTL is paradoxical, except by recourse to Platonism, one admits that it is an imperfect copy of the supposedly MLID OTL. And if it is, the question of whether it is MLID or MLD remains. Abakedi observes that:

> Many philosophers avoid naïve realism when discussing about the true nature of the world or the true nature of reality; but rather hold unto a representational realism. Why do proponents of the supposed OTL think that a naïve realist approach is possible for the OTL? … the supposed OTL… cannot do the job of describing its own true nature even if it were to be conceived as a thing-in-itself; some other logic will have to do the job. Therefore, the proponents of the supposed OTL cannot avoid the problem that if there is a supposed OTL that better describes the true nature of reality, there should be another OTL that should describe the true nature of the given OTL. (ABAKEDI 2020, 136)

Abakedi's arguments in the foregoing quotation are very significant for Ezumezu logic in three ways. First, it allows one to ask whether the realities that the Africans conceive, using the logical notions that Ezumezu logic purportedly axiomatizes, are realities as they are ultimately, or simply as they are subjectively perceived or conceptualized. In other words, from the perspective of realism about logic, is axiomatization in Ezumezu logic about MLID realities or MLD copies or

representations of them, or both? Put differently, are the logical notions preserved within mathematization in the prototype of Ezumezu logic about MLID facts or subjective MLD copies or both?[2] These are some of the philosophical issues bordering on the metaphysics of logic that must be addressed even in discourses on African logic.

Secondly, just as a supposed OTL requires a MLID truth-maker, Ezumezu logic, which Chimakonam presents as a supposedly one-true-African logical grounding for African Philosophy also requires a truth-maker. Although this is not specifically discussed by Chimakonam, one wonders whether it is a MLID world or a MLD world. And if the truth-maker of Ezumezu logic is not the MLID world, it becomes difficult to anchor its veridicality on the traditional epistemological approach of foundationalism in the way Chimakonam attempts to do for African indigenous philosophy and theoretical inquiries.

Thirdly, just as a supposed OTL cannot correctly describe itself and the MLID world simultaneously, Ezumezu logic cannot simultaneously describe itself and the supposedly MLID reality simultaneously. Another logic will be needed to correctly describe or critique Ezumezu logic. And if Ezumezu logic, by virtue of its being assigned the status of the one-true-logical foundation of African philosophy is true, then the logic that will correctly describe it must also be true. But will such a logic be another OTL co-existing with Ezumezu logic? Responding in the affirmative will imply upholding logical pluralism. Or will it be a pseudo-copy of the one-true-Ezumezu logic? Responding affirmatively will also imply Platonism; and Platonism here explicates logical pluralism rather than monism.

The problem here is that it is only by describing Ezumezu logic as MLID, that the idea of its being the foundation of African Philosophy can make sense. This is because if a logical foundation is not seen as something stable, then it cannot function as such a grounding. And the kind of foundationalism that can allow Ezumezu logic to stand meaningfully as a stable logical foundation of African philosophy is that which is typical to the category regarded as MLID. But how can a logic that has been radically constructed by a very intelligent but finite mind, such as that of Chimakonam, be MLID, when it is actually a MLD invention? This is one aspect of the ID paradox that brings to the table, the problem of foundationalism in the metaphysics of Ezumezu logic.

One way to avoid the ID paradox is to admit that different African philosophies have different logical foundations. This is logical pluralism. Foundationalism in logic has been predominantly championed by logical monists who see the metaphysical category of MLID as a safe haven to establish the thesis of OTL that has a MLID truth-maker. But as can be seen from the radical construction of Ezumezu logic by Chimakonam, the principles, rules or laws of logic are not pre-existent MLID things-in-themselves but MLD inventions. This is why it

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[2] A critical realist will rather uphold the view that logical notions describe MLD copies or representations of the supposedly MLID world (see ABAKEDI, IWUAGWU and EGBAI 2021, 8).

can be argued that no single logic-prototype (neither the Aristotelian logic nor Ezumezu logic) can enjoy the metaphysical status of being the sole logical foundation of all possible systematic speculations about reality in any given possible world, be it geographical or cultural. Making any single logic-prototype a foundation for all possible inquiries in a particular field, entails situating it within the metaphysical category of mind-and-language-independence. But situating logic in this category does not augur well for its functional role as the mind's tool of description (ABAKEDI 2020, 146) because this amounts to searching for a preconceived metaphysical essence for logic. But Klima has argued that the beauty of logic lies in not looking for such a preconceived essence (KLIMA 2014).

Ezumezu and the Paradox of Inconsistent Metaphysical Categorization
In the metaphysical categorization of logic, we can identify different traditions: that which describes the supposed structure of the world as logic (see SCHAFFER 2010); that which describes the supposed structure of the mind as logic (as was defended by KANT 1999); and that which describes logic as the hermeneutical tools of formal and informal language.

Nick Zangwill describes logical constants, which are basically the linguistic concepts of formal logic as real things or facts that exist in the world (ZANGWILL 2015, 254)[3]. Chimakonam's discussions that attempt to explain the logical notion of complementarity, uses illustrations that betray his treatment of alethic semantics (T, F) somewhat as ontologic entities, in much the same way in which Zangwill does with the logical constants of conjunction, disjunction and negation. In some paragraphs, he treats the objects of Ezumezu logic as statements and in other paragraphs he treats them as things-in-themselves. For instance, his discourse on value-gap and value-glut, gives the impression that the alethic semantics (T, F) are things-in-themselves of the sort that can move from spatial positions of a gap to a complementary position of a glut. This is obvious in the illustrations that are aimed to show that T and F can coexist as C =TF. But this begs the question of whether it is the alethic truth-values (T, F) that exhibit the circular inertia that bridges the value-gap to make way for a glut, or that the glut is a reflection of the mind's inability to make a complete valued-judgement because of the absence of complete information about given realities.

If anything is true, it should be independent of human mind and language (MLID), but can we say that human attempts to communicate what is true are not mind-and-language-dependent? More so, Rayo has argued that the true things we say about reality does not necessarily mean that we have perfectly captured the metaphysical structure of reality (RAYO 2013, 9). Even if Ezumezu logic is seen as improving the conception of reality beyond the limitations of classical bivalent logic, the question still remains whether the newly introduced logical notions that Chimakonam claims were missing from the Aristotelian prototype, now equip the

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[3] Cf. ABAKEDI and ARICHE 2022, 5-13 for a more detailed critique of Zangwill's view

human mind with the ability to capture reality as it really is completely and perfectly. I do not see Chimakonam responding to this question in the affirmative.

In this regard, what Rayo calls *metaphysicalism*, which is the view that (i) reality has multiple parts, (ii) that logical propositions map unto the structure of reality, and (iii) that our conceptualizations and descriptions of reality as MLID entities do not reduce to complete knowledge of reality as they are as things-in-themselves, is also significant to a philosophical examination or critique of Ezumezu logic. No matter what the members of the conversationalist school of philosophy claim to be the scope of African logic, as one of the authors was made to understand in his conversations with Lucky Ogbonnaya, the problem posed by *metaphysicalism* remains significant for a philosophy of African logic, and cannot just be waved away.

Regarding alethic semantics (T, F) as ontologic entities rather than mere valued-mental concepts conflicts with the functional role of logic as the mind's linguistic tool of description. Moreover, using the valuation of Ezumezu logic: about a particular statement S about a given reality R; whereas some minds can decide T, some others may decide F and some others may decide C. Without supposing that the given reality R is MLID, then neither parties whose valued-judgements are T, F or C can be said to be correct or wrong. What results is similar to what obtains in philosophy of physics, different valued-judgements by different parties meaning that each party is in a unique possible world.

Conclusion

Indeed, the ingenuity of the convener of the Conversational School of Philosophy (CSP) for the strides unequalled in the history of African philosophy and African logic must be applauded. Surely, he will forever be remembered for his contributions to the development of African philosophy and logic; nevertheless, as it is characteristic of every philosophical epoch, new systems bring to the table new issues for philosophical discussions. This is what conversationalism has done.

From extant literature, the conversationalist approach, as a method, seeks to engage old ideas in view of bringing up new ones that improve on the weaknesses of previous ones (CHIMAKONAM 2015a, 2015b, 2016, 2017a, 2017b, 2018). This paper examined how Ezumezu faired with logical realism and discussed some of the issues bordering on its metaphysical status. It is hoped that Chimakonam will promptly respond to some of the reservations raised here, which will spring up more scholarly debates for a philosophy of African logic and be very much useful to an ongoing project.

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