

**EZUMEZU LOGICAL SYSTEM AS A SCEPTICAL TREND
IN CONTEMPORARY AFRICAN PHILOSOPHY**DOI: <https://dx.doi.org/10.4314/ajct.v3i2.3>**Submission: September 30, 2023 Accepted: November 13, 2023**

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My aim in this paper is to tease out the sceptical dimension of Ezumezu logic, which is the logic that grounds the method of conversational thinking. I engage with the question of the place of scepticism in African philosophy and show that Ezumezu logic is a sceptical trend in contemporary African philosophy. I argue that the nature of the basic principles and concepts, such as arumaristics, thesis of regimented ontology, benoke point, tension of incommensurables, disjunctive-conjunctive motion, and methodological anarchy, that constitute a major part of Ezumezu logical system point to the need for continuous inquiry while suspending judgement, thereby encouraging the production of new thoughts. I demonstrate that this suspension of judgment is a basic tenet of scepticism.

Keywords: Ezumezu logic, Scepticism, Conversational thinking, Concepts, Principles

Introduction

Is there scepticism in African philosophy? If there is, what is the nature of such scepticism? And what is the place of scepticism in African philosophy? These fundamental questions engage my attention in this work, and I point to two possible responses. The first is the denial that there is scepticism in African philosophy, and the

second is that scepticism is present in African philosophy. Opinions will certainly be divided in line with these responses. If, on the one hand, one denies scepticism in African philosophy, one might do so on the ground that scepticism is a Western concept and does not cohere with the thinking style in and of African philosophy and philosophers. They might even point to the ethnophilosophy school, especially of the modern period in African philosophy. This is particularly evident in the earlier iteration of the ethnophilosophy school, and its desire to describe African thought. Within this framework, the questioning that marks scepticism is fairly absent. In fact, it would seem that the very questioning of those pre-colonial ideas that form the hallmark of the regurgitative attitude of ethnophilosophy renders such questioning un-African. On the other hand, if one affirms the existence of scepticism in African philosophy, one might do so by taking recourse to the days of the great debate on the existence or otherwise of African philosophy (HOUNTONDI 1983; AZENABOR 2002). One might consider the meta-philosophical debate as a form of scepticism or a sceptical approach to African philosophy.

For those who might wish to deny scepticism in African philosophy, I argue in this paper that scepticism is not strictly a Western philosophical theory, even though there is a rich tradition of scepticism in Western philosophy. It is an idea that is inherent in most African concepts and cultural maxims. While I agree with anyone who may wish to affirm the existence of scepticism in African philosophy, I, however, disagree that scepticism in African philosophy is traceable to the great debate. My reason is that scepticism in African philosophy is a deeper and more critical approach to issues of concern in African philosophy. However, one can also argue that in its systematized form, scepticism, as a way of doing African philosophy, is a more recent development – one that truly began with the systematization of African logic in Chimakonam's Ezumezu logic.

I aim to demonstrate in this work that there is a sceptical movement in African philosophy in the 21st century, which has been very instrumental to the progress and development of the discipline by orchestrating a more rigorous engagement among scholars on substantial issues of concern in the African life world. I will show how Ezumezu logical system, which grounds conversational

thinking as a philosophical method, is a sceptical trend in contemporary African philosophy. I will unveil the sceptical nature of the basic principles and concepts such as arumaristic, thesis of regimented ontology, benoke point, tension of incommensurables, disjunctive-conjunctive motion and methodological anarchy that constitute a major part of Ezumezu logical system. I will show how these concepts and principles point to the need for continuous inquiry, while suspending judgement, thereby encouraging the production of new thoughts. I contend that this suspension of judgement is a basic tenet of scepticism.

Thus, I begin by first conceptualizing scepticism and its inception in the field of Western philosophy. Second, I expose very briefly the nature of Ezumezu as the logic of conversational thinking. Third, using some of the principles and concepts of Ezumezu logic, I show its place/role as a sceptical trend in contemporary African philosophy.

Scepticism in Perspective

The word scepticism denotes both academicism and pyrrhonism alongside other positions that question the nature of the existence of human knowledge (ZIEMINSKA 2017). While the first is radical, and the second is moderate in their approach, they are nevertheless underlined by the sceptical attitude of suspension of judgment. Otherwise known as *epoche* (see EMPIRICUS 1990). For Renata Ziemska (2017), scepticism, as understood in contemporary times, refers to the thesis that knowledge does not exist. This is a radical rendition of the notion of scepticism, and this is not the sense that I subscribe to in this work.

Scepticism is said to have originated from Greek philosophy (MACHUCA 2011; ZIEMINSKA 2017). Pyrrho of Elis, believed to be one of its first proponents, was known to have travelled to study in India and propounded the adoption of practical scepticism. In other words, Pyrrho argued for the adoption of scepticism as a way of life. Arcesilaus and Carneades later developed more theoretical perspectives and challenged the notions of absolute truth and falsity. Carneades, for instance, criticized the views of the dogmatists, especially supporters of Stoicism, asserting that absolute certainty of knowledge is impossible. It was Sextus Empiricus who developed the position further and, as a result, is regarded as the main authority

for Greek scepticism (WALKER 1912; SAHAKIAN 1969; STERLING 1955; STUMPF 1994).

Despite questioning the possibility of the apprehension of absolute truth or knowledge, Empiricus' brand of scepticism encourages continuous inquiry by means of suspension of judgment. This explains why most scholars refer to sceptics as 'inquirers' or 'seekers' (LAGERLUND 2020, 80; LEACH 2021, 77).

Expatriating on the nature of scepticism, Empiricus observes, in his *Outlines of Scepticism*, that scepticism is aimed at attaining mental peace or calmness because of the contradictions of things and the confusion that has plagued humanity. In line with this, Empiricus was convinced that thorough investigation or questioning would aid in determining truth from falsehood, thereby attaining tranquillity of mind (EMPIRICUS 1994). The implication is that despite the contradictions replete in the world of knowledge and its pursuit, one can still attain peace of mind through continuous investigation or search (ENYIMBA 2023).

Following the different perceptions of the meaning of truth by different philosophers, three kinds of people who seek after truth can be identified. The first are the dogmatists who believe that they have apprehended the truth. The second are those who aver that they have not been able to apprehend truth because truth cannot be apprehended. The third are those who persistently and patiently continue to investigate, question or seek after truth without coming to a conclusion. In other words, they suspend judgment in matters concerning absolute truth, knowledge or the truth-value of propositions (EMPIRICUS 1990; 1994). This is the sense of scepticism employed by Empiricus, which I subscribe to in this work.

As C. F. Balfour (1980) rightly observes, this sense of scepticism involves some form of disbelief grounded in rationality. It is worthy of note here that this conception of scepticism appears to be in tandem with the definition of scepticism given above. Thus, for Balfour, this systematic doubt or disbelief must possess the attribute of rationality to give it a sound footing. Similar to this conception is L. J. Walker's (1912) description of scepticism as that form of doubt that is based on rational grounds and a denial of the possibility of attaining truth. The problem with Walker's definition of scepticism is that he did not make clear the nature of truth. This paper aligns

with the definition of scepticism that denies or suspends judgment in matters concerning absolute truth or the certainty of truth.

Ezumezu as the Logic of Conversational Thinking

One of the fundamental presuppositions of the theory and method of conversational thinking is that there is no effective and durable system without a sound and viable logic that foregrounds it (CHIMAKONAM 2019). In light of this, Ezumezu logic, which is a trivalent system of logic, was developed by Jonathan O. Chimakonam to show the logic that foregrounds the method and system of conversational thinking. As a logic of conversational thinking, Ezumezu logic is flexible and dynamic and is evident in the interrelationship between nwa-nsa and nwa-nju, as much as it is applicable in any universe of discourse.

Before delving into the nature of Ezumezu as the logic that grounds the method of conversational thinking, it is important I briefly highlight what the method of conversational thinking entails. As defined by Chimakonam, conversational thinking is a philosophical method that allows individual thinkers to engage each other philosophically on phenomenological issues of concern. For him, it is not a mere exchange of ideas or simply an informal dialogue between interlocutors, but rather a strictly formal intellectual exercise orchestrated by philosophical reasoning in which critical and rigorous questioning creatively unveils new concepts from old ones (CHIMAKONAM 2015a).

Conversational thinking portrays a strict formal intellectual engagement between or among “proponents called nwanasa and opponents called nwanju who engage in an arumaristics on a specific thought in which critical and rigorous questioning and answering are employed to creatively unveil new concepts and open new vistas for thought” (CHIMAKONAM 2017a, 116; 2017b, 115-130). Nwanasa is the party in a relationship that holds and defends a position. Nwanju is the other party in that creative relationship whose duty is to question the veracity and viability of the position of nwanasa. In other words, nwanju and nwanasa may represent different scholars with different ideas and from different philosophical places that constructively engage with each other in a mutually beneficial and creative encounter. The aim is to reveal the loopholes and creatively fill up the lacuna, and not to destroy, discount or displace the identity

of the other. As I have observed elsewhere, this relationship between *nwansa* and *nwanju* is flexible and accommodative of other indices, traditions, cultures, identities, or positions so as to ensure progress and development that can be sustained for a long time (ENYIMBA 2019a; OSUALA & ENYIMBA 2022). The implication is that *nwansa* and *nwanju* are discreet in their interactions with each other and with other stakeholders to avoid absolutization of one position above the other.

In distinguishing conversational thinking from Socratic dialectics, Chimakonam (2017a) explains that while Socratic dialectic is targeted at establishing the falsity of a position and the truth of its negation, conversational thinking places a premium on sustaining the intellectual and creative encounter rather than the outcome of such encounter. Thus, the focus for the conversationalist is not the absolute refutation of an idea but the mutual development of differing ideas from differing contexts through interaction. In this way, the possibility of the emergence of new ideas or new evidence is not stifled by combativeness, exclusivity and/or absolute negation. The eight canons of conversational philosophy, developed by Chimakonam, further lends credence to the above observation. These canons, according to him, are intended to underline the minimum requirements, modes, focus and direction of thinking in a conversational manner in contemporary African philosophy. Accordingly, these canons include the need for “critical conversation, transformative indigenization, noetic re-Africanization, moderate decolonization, constructive modernization, non-veneration of authorities, theoretic interrogation and the checking of perverse dialogue” (2017b, 19-20).

According to him, conversational philosophy derives its background inspiration from an African notion of relationship, communion, or interdependence. It provides a theoretic framework upon which most discourses in African philosophy could be grounded, especially as it takes phenomenological issues as its concern in the contemporary period. Chimakonam explains very clearly that conversational philosophy is the school of thought, conversational thinking is the name of the system, and conversationalism is the method (CHIMAKONAM 2017b). In recent works, Chimakonam (2019) employs conversationalism interchangeably with conversational thinking.

I return now to the nature of Ezumezu logic. Ezumezu is drawn from three Igbo notions, namely, ezu (Truth), izu (Falsity) and ezumezu (Complemented). The third notion ezumezu is the middle value or the point of complementation, which accords the logical system its name – “Ezumezu” spelt with Capital ‘E’. It is the need for a logic that is inspired by an African background ontology and worldview, and yet universalizable, that gave inspiration to the emergence of Ezumezu Logic. Ezumezu logic is a systematic attempt at unmasking the age- long Western particular that has been elevated to the level of universal and absolute, and undergirded by Aristotelian two-valued logic, despite its obvious limitations (ENYIMBA 2022). Ezumezu logic is an attempt at reconstructing the grossly distorted history of rationality, logic, and epistemologies of the global South.

Ezumezu logic is a trivalent or Three-valued logic which is symbolically represented with the Letters T, F and C. In Ezumezu logic, and contrary to classic Western logic, T & F can complement in the value ‘C’. Ezumezu logic also recognizes the context-dependent nature of propositions, and interdependence of variables or values. This particular feature of Ezumezu logical system exposes the inadequacies of the three laws of thought in Aristotle’s two-valued logic, and the need for additional laws that would strengthen them. At this point, it is important to state that Ezumezu logic differs remarkably from Western two-valued logic in the following three ways: first, while Ezumezu logic is flexible in its mode of reasoning and application of the laws of thought, Western two-valued logic is strict or rigid in its approach; second, Ezumezu logic extends the two-valued logic by relaxing the three laws of thought – identity, contradiction and excluded middle (CHIMAKONAM 2019; ENYIMBA 2022); third, the formulation of three new and supplementary laws – Njikoka, Nmekoka and Onona-etiti to complement the existing three laws of thought of western two-valued logic. Ezumezu logic does this to cover the gamut of human reasoning as a whole, which the classic laws of thought in Western logic could not sufficiently do (CHIMAKONAM 2019).

The nature of these three additional laws of thought is such that the law of Njikoka maintains that because things exist in a network, every existence forms a necessary link of reality and nothing that exists stands alone (CHIMAKONAM 2019). As

Chimakonam observes, this does not warrant any form of synthesis, because everything in the network retains its identity despite being in a relationship with all things. The law of Nmekoka maintains that things exist in a complementary network where things complement themselves. C is the third value called ezumezu or nwa-izugbe consisting of ezu and izu. In the contextual mode, the value of ezu and izu is either true or false, but when in the Complementary mode, the values of ezu and izu are both present (CHIMAKONAM 2019). This points to the fact that everything serves a missing link of reality. Complementation, which Nmekoka supposes is driven by arumaristic reasoning and not dialectic reasoning, so no synthesis is expected. The law of Onona-etiti maintains that everything that exists serves different functions from context to context. According to Chimakonam, through this, Ezumezu logic seeks to form the third value called nwa-izugbe from the interaction of nwansa and nwanju (CHIMAKONAM 2019). It accounts for the intermediary values (not altogether true and not altogether false). It includes what was excluded in the old laws of excluded middle. One can notice the synergy between and among these three supplementary laws of Ezumezu logical system, and how they work in harmony to sustain arguments, contestations or inquiries without envisaging any form of synthesis or agreement.

From the above, we can see that Ezumezu logic rides on the following basic assumptions: that no philosophical tradition is absolute because each is an alternative to the other; and that the complementation of seemingly opposed things or ideas, is possible (CHIMAKONAM 2019; ENYIMBA 2022).

It is these additional laws of thought that undergird some of the important principles of Ezumezu logic. These principles include, *Sub-Contrary Valuation*, which allows two opposing values to complement each other without contradictions. This principle is evident in the nwansa-nwanju interaction in conversational thinking, where none of them loses their identity while engaging with the other. Another principle is *the Modes*, which shows how the complementation of the two standard values (sub-contraries), in a third value (ezumezu), does not erase the two-valued logic, and shows how one can make an inferential switch from two-valued

logic to three-valued logic viz. the contextual mode and complementary mode¹.

Another principle is the *Context Principle*. According to Chimakonam, this principle holds that “whatever that is stated, is a statement about something and that which is stated to be meaningful must be stated within a context” (2019, 99). This is because entities or variables shed their meanings and acquire new ones from context to context. Again, this is evident in nwansa-nwanju interaction in conversational thinking. As variables, nwansa and nwanju can assume different natures and occupy different positions depending on the context of discourse (ENYIMBA 2019a). This further reveals how Ezumezu logic undergirds conversational thinking. Generally, Ezumezu logic overcomes the challenge of truth-value gap created by the three-valued logic of Stephen Kleene and Jan Lukasiewicz, and this is what distinguishes the method of conversational thinking from the rest of the methodologies in African philosophy and studies.

Unveiling the Sceptical Nature of Ezumezu Logic in Contemporary African Philosophy

Here, I will show that Ezumezu logical system is a sceptical trend in contemporary African philosophy. It is a complex system with numerous new concepts and fundamental principles making up its structure. Some of these concepts and principles weaved together in the development of the logical system ride on scepticism and unveil the sceptical nature of the system. One must recall at this point, and as noted earlier in this work, that the form of scepticism referred to here is that which is characterized by continuous investigation while suspending judgment on matters of absolute knowledge or statement. It is not the form that denies the possibility of knowledge, rather, it is

¹ The contextual mode of interpretation sees *ezu* and *izu* (True and False) as peripheries to the centre, which interprets variables on a contextual basis. The complementary_mode_of_interpretation allows the two standard values/sub-contraries to be joined together in an intermediary third value through a conjunctive motion that results in ‘ezumezu’. This outcome, ezumezu, then assumes a complementary mode where variables are treated not on a textual basis, but on a complementary basis.

the form that refrains from passing judgment on any question of absolute knowledge. It is a continuous process of inquiry in which every explanation of experience is tested by a counter experience, and every account of truth or knowledge is tested by a counter or alternative account. Thus, scepticism is an intellectual enterprise that emphasizes continuous and rigorous thought, debate and disputation on substantial issues of concern. The concepts and principles of Ezumezu logic that I shall engage with include arumaristic, thesis of regimented ontology, benoke point, tension of incommensurables, disjunctive-conjunctive motion, and methodological anarchy, among others.

Arumaristic

I have devoted enough space in earlier work to critically engage and expose the concept of arumaristics and its sceptical nature (see ENYIMBA 2023). I shall, therefore, not dwell much on it here. The logical concept and principle – arumaristics suggest that Ezumezu logical system portrays a continuous relationship that may not have an end but thrives on rigorous questioning and answering, which is a cardinal feature of scepticism. According to Chimakonam “the noun arumaristics is defined as a type of critical encounter that involves the reshuffling of thesis and anti-thesis, each time at a higher level without the expectation of a synthesis” (2017a, 116; 2017b, 17). Thus, Chimakonam uses “arumaristics” to describe a procedure for reasoning in which thesis and anti-thesis complement rather than coalesce or fuse together and maintain their individualities.

The notion of arumaristics upon which Chimakonam founded the method of conversationalism is drawn from an Igbo word “arumaruka” or “Iruka”, which Chimakonam christened “arumaristics”. An analysis of these two Igbo words and their possible English renditions will reveal that “Iruka” means ‘doubt on matters/issues or doubting of matters or issues’. It refers to the act of argumentation by continuously asking questions in order to clear disbelief. This sense of the word “Iruka” is in consonance with what Chimakonam describes as critical creative struggle. It is creative in the sense that its main goal is to formulate new concepts by opening up new vistas for thoughts, and it is a creative struggle in the sense that the epistemic agents involved pit themselves against each other in a continuous disagreement.... (2017a: 17). Thus, though “Iruka”

implies conversation, it also constitutes doubt, doubting, arguing or argumentation. Iruka is then not just a critical creative conversation between two epistemic agents, but also a creative, critical and systematic doubt involving two or more agents or parties.

Similarly, “arumaru-uka” which is the other variant of “Iruka” is a combination of two Igbo words, namely, “arumaru” and “uka”. “Arumaru” here means “doubting”, “disbelieving”, or “argumentation”. “Uka”, on the other hand, means “matters”, “issues of concern”, or “matter on hand”. Following this, “arumaruka” would mean doubt or disbelief over an issue or matter, expressed through continuous questioning and answering. This is the type of engagement Chimakonam explains should exist between conversationalists in African philosophy. The point being made here is that ‘arumaruka’ or ‘iruka’ as employed in Ezumezu logical system and Conversational thinking is a systematic doubt involving the suspension of judgement and, therefore, a form of scepticism.

Thesis of Regimented Ontology

The concept and principle of Ezumezu logic known as the thesis of regimented ontology signifies the fact that no single theory can account for the ontological structure of all things. This is a truism inherent in the Igbo maxim “Uwa ezu oke” meaning that “nothing is complete/there is no grand norm of knowledge”. Herein also lies the sceptical attitude that characterizes the Ezumezu logical system. Recall that the sense of scepticism employed in this work is that which does not absolutize truth, knowledge, or propositional statements about any aspect of reality, but rather refrains from making conclusions while continuing the search after truth or knowledge. One of the reasons this principle adopts this approach is its recognition that there could be other views or perspectives that presents a new and/or different claim that may, nevertheless, be relevant. Also, though theories may be universally applicable, they nonetheless resonate with the cultural background they emerge from. This explains why conversational thinking, and the Ezumezu logic that undergirds it, neither seeks to absolutize nor play down any particular perspective to knowledge but gives room for the other in a mutually beneficial manner.

The notion of “Uwa ezu oke” from where the concept and principle of regimented ontology were derived, is a traditional Igbo-

African maxim that expresses a sceptical attitude towards the nature of the universe or reality. Inhered in the maxim is the idea that reality is not complete in itself, and that there can be no complete or absolute knowledge of it. As a result, absolute judgment about reality should be suspended, while investigation or inquiry into the nature of reality should be continued in a rigorous and critical manner. This substantiates my earlier claim that scepticism is evident in the Igbo-African philosophical worldview.

Benoke Point

The concept of benoke is another Igbo-African inspired idea, conceptualized into a logico-philosophical principle by Chimakonam (2019) to further explain the nature of arumaristic relationships in both conversational thinking and its logical ambience - Ezumezu. The idea of Benoke is laden with scepticism and so is open to a sceptical interpretation. For example, it is used by Chimakonam to denote that instance in a logico-philosophical and conversational discourse when intellectually interacting variables would not agree or come to any form of finality in their conversational engagement. This is the point that can rightly be referred to as the point of suspension of judgment, thereby sustaining the conversational engagement and the continuous search for truth. Benoke is derived from the Igbo words bere (reaching) and n'oke (the limit or terminal point), and it describes the point beyond which complementing variables cannot come close (CHIMAKONAM 2018; 2019).

As a result of the ontological variance of opposed variables, benoke ensures the absence of synthesis in conversational thinking and of course in Ezumezu logic that grounds it. In line with the claim of this essay, benoke further signifies the point of suspension of judgement in the creative struggle between nwanza and nwanza. Benoke point is the point of suspension of judgement and continuous contestation, protestation, and conversation between and among variables through the creative struggle. It is the high point of the sceptical process (ENYIMBA 2023). It is this principle that continues to enable the unveiling of new concepts and new vistas for thought. This implies that while conversational thinking, which rides on the crest of arumaristics, regards a synthesis as an anathema, it encourages the suspension of judgement, which amounts to continuous inquiry, and benoke greases this sceptical process. In

corroborating the significance of benoke in conversational thinking, Umezurike J Ezugwu and Uchenna A Ezeogu (2021) aver that the principle of benoke point is a core principle of the system that distinguishes the system from dialectical thinking.

Conjunctive-Disjunctive Motion and Tension of Incommensurables

The sceptical activities and functions of the logical concept of benoke is also lubricated by other logical concepts and principles such as the conjunctive-disjunctive motion and the tension of incommensurables. As stated in the previous section, benoke is a point where two seemingly opposed variables that are engaged in a conversational encounter cannot cross since crossing this point would involve a synthesization of both nwanza and nwanju into a single thesis. An effort at this particular point towards coalescing these contestants and protestants will trigger a situation of tension of incommensurables, which is a mechanism that enables the determination of the instance when complementation has collapsed or is no longer possible. The tension of incommensurables is a flow out of the convivial activities of the concessional bridge and complementary turn². The point at which the complementation of interacting variables has become necessary is determinable through the mechanism of the concessional bridge, and the task of determining when actual complementation has begun is performed through the mechanism of the complementary turn.

Thus, diverse and opposing variables, which are in a disjunctive relationship, apart from each other, when they come to understand the need for mutual interaction, reversing the disjunctive motion into a conjunctive motion. Thus, when there is differentiation of opinions, as opposed variables diverge, we encounter the disjunctive mode/motion. And when there is a complementation of seemingly opposed perspectives, we encounter the conjunctive motion (CHIMAKONAM 2019). All of these activities and interactions between and among these mechanisms, and principles are geared towards suspension of judgment by avoiding or refusing,

² Concessional bridge is defined as a mechanism for determining when complementation has become necessary; and complementary turn is defined as a mechanism for determining when actual complementation has begun to take place (see CHIMAKONAM 2019, 142).

at all cost, any form of synthesis between and among contesting, protesting and interacting variables engaged in conversational encounters. This is scepticism.

Methodological Anarchy

In his attempt to demonstrate the nature of Ezumezu as a methodology, Chimakonam introduced the notion of anarchy as one of the technical concepts in conversational thinking and in Ezumezu logic. And this is one of the many concepts that carries with it the attitude of scepticism.

Chimakonam thinks that it is possible, and I agree with him, to construe Ezumezu as a sort of methodological anarchism since it contributes to epistemic disagreement in the postmodern sense (CHIMAKONAM 2019). Conversational thinking, for him, gears towards disagreement and not agreement or synthesis. Since conversational thinking is a rule-guiding system, he imagines a situation where there is order in disorder. This type of order in disorder gives rise to what he terms anarchistic orderliness or conversational orderliness.

The significance of this conception of Ezumezu logic and the conversational system as anarchistic orderliness or methodological anarchism or conversational orderliness is that it reveals the nature of conversational thinking and, indeed, its logical ambience – Ezumezu, as a system that does not encourage finality or absolutism. It is rather a system that constantly seeks the continuation of conversations, thereby, encouraging disagreements between and among variables engaged in a conversational encounter. What is referred to here by Chimakonam as anarchistic orderliness or methodological anarchism, can be conceived as philosophical disputation or disagreement, in the sense of a systematic and methodic doubt.

Chimakonam's attempt at equating anarchism with disagreement and arumaristic, unveils the sceptical attitudes of protestations from nwanja who proposes new ideas and contestations from nwanju, who opposes the new ideas, which does not aim at finality or synthesis but the continuation and sustenance of conversations.

Conclusion

Using some of its basic concepts and principles, Ezumezu logical system was shown to be a sceptical trend in contemporary African philosophy. Attention was drawn to the fact that in conversational thinking, and in Ezumezu logical system that grounds it, arumaristic relationship and anarchistic orderliness are made possible by the suspension of judgement. The notion of the thesis of regimented ontology also reveals that our understanding of reality is not absolute. This, along with the ideas of conjunctive and disjunctive motions, as well as benoke point all reveal the sceptical nature of Ezumezu logic and its method of conversational thinking.

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